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The Issue of Consent - For the Plaintiff or Defendant to Prove in Trespass to Person? 
In White v Johnston1 the vexed question of whether it is for a plaintiff to prove lack of consent to a 
trespass to person or for the defendant to establish consent as defence was considered. The court 
also considered the principles of assessing an award of exemplary damages. 
The respondent attended the appellant’s dental surgery for treatment for approximately six months 
in 2009. It was alleged that the appellant had carried out treatment that was unnecessary and 
ineffective. The respondent argued that the treatments were so ineffective they were negligent. 
Trespass and assault were also raised on the basis that the appellant knew the treatments to be 
ineffective and unnecessary.  The trial judge entered a verdict based upon assault and did not 
determine the alternative case of negligence.  The respondent was awarded general damages of 
$140,000, $10,000 in aggravated damages and $150,000 in exemplary damages.  The decision of 
Dean v Phung2 appears to have influenced the trial judge. That case was the first appellate 
consideration of a claim for damages for medical treatment that excluded the Civil Liability Act 2002 
(NSW) and also involved dental treatment.3   In Dean v Phung the following four principles in respect 
of consent to medical treatment were made:4 
 Consent is valid if the patient has been given basic information as to the nature of the 
proposed procedure, but that consent is vitiated if the nature of the procedure has been 
misrepresented. This includes if the procedure was not capable of addressing the patient’s 
condition. 
 A failure to advise or the provision of wrong advice as to risks and adverse outcomes of a 
proposed procedure may be a breach of the practitioner’s duty of care in negligence, but 
does not affect the patient’s consent. 
 If the motive of the practitioner was that the treatment was carried out for a non-
therapeutic purpose only and this was not disclosed to the patient, there is no valid consent. 
 If the issue is raised of whether there is valid consent, the onus of proof is on the 
practitioner to establish that the procedure had been validly consented to. 
The trial judge in White v Johnston decided that the appellant had carried out the treatment for the 
purpose of obtaining money from the government (the respondent was a war veteran and medical 
bills were paid for by the Department of Veterans’ Affairs) and not for the purpose of treating the 
respondent and therefore there was no consent. This conclusion was made based upon the evidence 
submitted to establish that the appellant had a tendency to charge for work she did not perform.5 
The award of exemplary damages was made without reference to the civil liability legislation6 and 
the amount was determined by reference to the similarity of the considerations with Dean v Phung. 
On appeal, the finding that every treatment was unnecessary and not for therapeutic purposes was 
challenged, as was the tendency evidence and the award of exemplary damages. The Court of 
Appeal allowed the appeal, setting aside the judgment of the District Court and remitted the 
proceedings for retrial confined to the claim in negligence. 
Leeming JA delivered the main judgment of the court and discussed the law of consent in detail. The 
main principles of consent were summarised as: 
 Non-consensual medical treatment gives rise to assault as a criminal offence and a tort.7 
 Consent to medical treatment may be oral and often is if the procedure is relatively minor. 
 Consent may be express or implied and whether it has been given is a question of fact.8 
 Defects as to obtaining consent are relevant for negligence rather than assault and battery.9 
 A misrepresentation of risks or a failure to disclose risks associated with medical treatment 
done in order to obtain consent will not give rise to valid consent.10 
As the trial judge had determined liability upon a finding that the motive of the appellant was to 
carry out treatment for non-therapeutic purposes and the appellant had failed to discharge the onus 
of proving valid consent had been given by the respondent, Leeming JA considered each of these in 
detail. 
Motive of Non-Therapeutic Purpose 
Leeming JA noted that in Dean v Phung it was held that consent may not be valid if ‘the 
practitioner’s unrevealed purpose is solely non-therapeutic’.11 His Honour observed that conduct 
very often occurs for multiple purposes and reasoned ‘most medical practitioners would attend their 
hospitals and surgeries each day in part for the purpose of deriving income including by rendering 
invoices to government’.12 The issue was whether if treatment was for a solely non-therapeutic 
purpose was that sufficient by itself or must it be accompanied by fraud or recklessness? In Dean v 
Phung Basten JA and Beazley P held that it was sufficient if the treatment was unnecessary in that it 
was not capable of amounting to a therapeutic response to the patient’s condition.13 The members 
of the court in White v Johnston preferred this less stringent approach, although Leeming JA did note 
that the reasoning of Macfarlan JA in the dissenting judgment of Dean v Phung has attracted some 
academic support.14 
As noted, the trial judge found that the treatment of the respondent was ‘wholly unnecessary’. 
However, there was no expert evidence presented that the treatments were incapable of providing 
a therapeutic response to the respondent’s condition.15 Therefore this did not support the 
conclusion that there was not valid consent to the treatments. 
Onus of Proof 
The trial judge held that the appellant had to prove that the consent to the treatments was valid in 
circumstances where fraud was alleged – the fraud being that the treatments were not for a 
therapeutic purpose but for the purpose of extracting money from the government. Leeming JA was 
critical of the trial judge’s reasons as they were ‘very brief, and drew no distinction between legal 
and evidentiary onus’.16 At [86] his Honour stated: 
If the validity of a patient’s consent is to be impugned by a finding which is tantamount to 
fraud by the medical practitioner, then the legal onus remains borne by the patient … 
The reasons given for this statement were: 
 This reflects the ordinary common law approach as to matters of proof – ‘[h]e who alleges 
must prove’.17 Applied to the facts of this case, the respondent patient alleged fraud so as to 
vitiate her consent, therefore the respondent bore the onus of proving that fraud.18 
 If the onus did not lie on the party asserting fraud, how could fraud be disproved? 
 The judgment of Basten JA in Dean v Phung as to the practitioner bearing the onus of 
proving valid consent was to be read naturally, and this referred to the evidentiary burden 
not the legal burden.19 
Therefore, the onus of proving that the treatments had no therapeutic purpose in order to establish 
a lack of valid consent, was on the patient.  As the respondent in White v Johnston had not 
established that the treatments were entirely non-therapeutic, there was no shift of the evidentiary 
burden to the appellant to prove consent.20 The respondent had not proven what she alleged and 
therefore had failed to prove her action. 
Is Lack of Consent an Element or is Consent a Defence? 
It is acknowledged by some that the very gist of trespass to person, is that there was a lack of 
consent to the interference.21 However, lack of consent does not appear to be expressed as an 
element of the action of battery under the common law.22 Leeming JA points out that the decision of 
Christopherson v Bare23 in 1848 establishes that the legal burden of proving an absence of consent 
was on the plaintiff as it was the gist of the action.24 His Honour also noted that an assault by a 
medical practitioner could be both tortious and criminal and that a ‘prosecutor at a criminal trial has 
long had to negate consent … It does not strike me as jarringly wrong for a civil plaintiff to be obliged 
to discharge the same burden (albeit, only to the civil standard) in order to establish a tortious 
assault and battery’.25   
Exemplary Damages 
The appellant appealed the award of exemplary damages by the trial judge. The award was made 
without reference to s 3B(1)(a) of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), instead there was 
acknowledgement that the facts of Dean v Phung were similar for which $150,000 in exemplary 
damages were awarded.  Section 3B(1)(a) provides that civil liability for an intentional act that is 
done with intent to cause injury or death is not subject to the provisions regarding damages for 
personal injury under the Act. The law of trespass to person is very clear – intention does not require 
an intention to cause injury, ‘it is the act and not the injury which must be intentional’.26 Although 
the evidence indicated that the act of the appellant was intentional, it did not establish that there 
was intent to cause injury and therefore the damages for personal injury had to be assessed 
according to the Act.27  
Although the verdict of the trial judge was set aside and exemplary damages could not be awarded 
for the respondent’s negligence action at re-trial,28 Leeming JA considered if the award of exemplary 
damages had be determined in accordance with the relevant principles. His Honour pointed out that 
the compensatory damages, including aggravated damages, must be determined before and award 
is made for exemplary damages.29 Further, although there were some similarities between the facts 
before the court and Dean v Phung the case were significantly different. The purpose of an award of 
exemplary damages is to punish and/or deter the wrongdoer.30 The appellant in this case was at 
most negligent and invoiced for some treatments not carried out, whereas the defendant in Dean v 
Phung carried out root canal therapy and fitted crowns on all teeth in over 53 consultations for only 
minor injuries to the plaintiff’s front teeth. 
Conclusion 
This decision is of interest as Leeming JA concludes after a thorough examination of the case law, 
that it is for a plaintiff to prove the absence of valid consent in assault and battery cases. Although 
obiter, his Honour has clearly set out the reasoning as to why lack of consent should be regarded as 
an element of the action. This is useful in light of the fact that this area of the law is unsettled with 
‘remarkably little discussion’ on point.31  
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